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WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
by Eric Schlachter, Esq. Cooley Godward LLP 
I n the early 1980s, Thomas Tcimpidis operated a bulletin 
board system in Los 
Angeles. In 1984, 
Tcimpidis was arrest-
ed because a user had 
posted stolen tele-
phone credit card numbers onto the BBS and 
Tcimpidis was charged with the misdemeanor of 
"knowingly and willfully" publishing the stolen 
numbers. Although the charges were eventually 
dropped, his arrest received national press cover-
age and drew attention to the potential liabilities 
faced by sysops for the actions of their users. 
Some sysops chose to shut down their system 
rather than face this liability. 
We now have accumulated 13 years of experience 
regarding the issues faced by sysops for the con-
tent they make available on their system. As we 
might expect, many issues have been clarified in 
the intervening time, while many other issues 
have remain unresolved. Although there are 
many interesting issues related to sysop liability 
for their own actions al,ld statements, the more 
difficult and complicated issues arise with respect 
to the liability faced by sysops, including 
Tcimpidis, for the activities and content of their 
users. Few sysops fully appreciate the extent of 
their liability for their users' or content provider's 
activities. This article focuses on some of the con-
clusions reached-and issues remaining-with 
respect to sysop liability for the statements and 
actions of third parties. 
LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY ACTIONS 
AND CONTENT IS NOT UNPRECEDENTED 
It is often assumed that sysop liability for a third 
party's actions is somehow unique or unprece-
dented. In fact, there are a wide variety of legal 
situations where one party shares liability for a 
third party's actions, many times without any 
wrongdoing on the part of the non-acting party. 
The following illustrate some situations where a 
party is liable for the statements or actions of 
third parties: 
• There are numerous situations where the 
principle of "vicarious liability" applies. 
Vicarious liability means that one party, 
regardless of conduct or intent, is liable for 
third party conduct. For example, an employ-
er is vicariously liable for its employees' con-
duct performed in the course of employment. 
Therefore, if an employee is required by his or 
her job to drive a truck, and the employee 
causes personal injuries to a pedestrian, the 
employer will be liable for such injuries even 
if the employer did nothing wrong. Similarly, 
partners in a partnership are vicariously 
liable for all partners' actions performed in 
the course of the partnership. 
• Parents can be liable for the conduct of their 
children. Sometimes liability does not accrue 
unless the parents were negligent in supervis-
ing their children; however, there are circum 
stances where the parent will be liable even 
if they were not negligent. 
• Property owners may be liable for the envi-
ronmental problems on their property, even if 
the problems were caused by a prior owner. 
• Closer to the sysop situation, newspapers and 
other "publishers" are liable for the content 
they publish, even if the content is provided 
by third parties. Therefore, if a newspaper 
publishes an article written by a free lance 
journalist or a news wire service, the news-
paper ordinarily will be liable for the harm cre 
ated from the article (as discussed above, if 
the article were written by a staff reporter, the 
newspaper would have been vicariously liable). 
Also, copyright law is a "strict liability tort," 
meaning that intent to violate is not a prerequi-
site to infringement. Therefore, film processors 
have been found liable for copyright infringe-
ment merely by processing rolls of film delivered 
by customers. Furthermore, there is a vicarious 
liability doctrine in copyright law which has 
held the proprietors of "dance halls" vicariously 
liable for the copyright infringements commit-
ted by bands that play at the venue. 
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The above list is certainly not com-
plete, but it illustrates the principle 
that there are many existing situations 
in a wide variety of legal doctrines 
where third parties can create liability 
for another. Therefore, perhaps sysop 
liability for third party actions and 
statements is not unprecedented. Of 
course, concluding that such sysop lia-
bility is a good thing is a different con-
clusion altogether. 
The body of law relating to sysop liability 
continues to grow in an ad hoc fashion as 
cases in various disciplines are decided 
without cross-reference or integrating 
analysis. Therefore, this section discusses 
cases on sysop liability for copyright, 
defamation and obscenity/pornography. A 
brief mention of trademarks is also made. 
COPYRIGHT 
There have been three United States 
cases reported on the issue of sysop lia-
bility for copyright infringement com-
mitted by their users. 
Playboy v. Frena, a 1993 case from a 
federal court in Florida, involved a situa-
tion where photos from Playboy had been 
scanned, digitized and uploaded to a bul-
letin board system in Florida called Techs 
Warehouse. George Frena, the sysop of 





in its favor, 
the court can grant 
there are no 
al issues of fact 
dispute. Frena 
argued that there 
was a material issue 
in dispute, since he 
claimed that his users were responsible 
for uploading the digitized photos to the 
system (although in the court's discus-
sion of trademark infringement, the 
court seems to believe that Frena him-
self had uploaded the photos-although 
the court was not permitted to make 
this factual determination in response 
to a summary judgment motion). 
The court granted Playboy's motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that 
whether Frena or his users had 
uploaded the files was irrelevant. The 
court concluded that Frena violated 
Playboy's right of "distribution," argu-
ing that "[t]here is no dispute that 
Defendant Frena supplied a product 
containing unauthorized copies of a 
copyrighted work. It does not matter 
that Defendant Frena claims he did 
not make the copies itself." In thinly 
worded analysis, the court also con-
cluded that Frena violated Playboy's 
right of "public display." 
The court concluded its analysis by 
reiterating why Frena's assertion that 
he did not load the files was irrelevant: 
"There is irrefutable evidence of direct 
copyright infringement in this case. It 
does not matter that Defendant Frena 
may have been unaware of the copy-
right infringement. Intent to infringe 
is not needed to find copyright 
infringement. Intent or knowledge is 
not an element of infringement, and 
thus even an innocent infringer is 
liable for infringement.. .. " 
Sega v. MAPHIA, a case from a federal 
court in Northern California, was ini-
tially decided in March 1994, closely 
after the Frena case. (A subsequent deci-
sion is discussed below; the initial deci-
sion is referred to as Sega I). In the Sega 
case, the defendants ran a bulletin 
board system called MAPHIA. Users of 
the MAPHIA BBS were able to get Sega 
game software which had been removed 
from the game cartridges and uploaded 
to the BBS. The defendants also sold 
"back up units" 
designed to allow 
users to copy Sega 
game cartridges. 
In connection 
with sales of such 
units, or on a 
standalone basis, 
defendants would 
permit buyers to 
download Sega 
games from the 
BBS. The defen-
dants would also 
allow those who 
uploaded Sega 
games to the BBS the right to download 
other games. 
The Sega I court found that the games 
had been uploaded to the BBS by users. 
The court made no conclusion that the 
sysops/defendants had uploaded the 
infringing material. Nevertheless, as in 
the Frena case, the Sega I court con-
cluded that the defendants had directly 
infringed Sega's copyrights. 
The Sega I court further concluded that 
MAPHIA had contributorily infringed 
Sega's copyrights. A contributory 
infringer is "one who, with knowledge 
of the infringing conduct of another, 
induces, causes or materially con-
tributes to the infringing conduct of 
another." The defendants could proper-
ly be deemed contributory infringers 
because they had actively promoted the 
BBS as an exchange of copyrighted 
material and had encouraged it 
through selling and bartering the 
rights to make downloads. 
The Frena and Sega I conclusion-that 
sysops are directly liable for copyright 
infringement by their users-has pro-
duced widespread criticism, but some pol-
icy makers have endorsed the result. The 
Clinton Administration appointed a task 
force to examine copyright issues in 
cyberspace, and in a 1995 ''White Paper," 
the task force endorsed direct liability for 
sysops. Some discussions have been had 
within Congress to implement this 
endorsement legislatively. Also, at the 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
meetings in December 1996 in Geneva, a 
worldwide treaty was proposed (and 
rejected) that would make sysops directly 
liable for copyright infringement. 
In December 1996, the Sega court ren-
dered a second ruling that clarified the 
first ruling. Based in part on the Netcom 
decision (discussed in the next para-
graph), the Sega II court concluded that 
since the sysop did not upload the 
games to the BBS, he was not directly 
liable for copyright infringement. 
However, due to his encouragement of 
unauthorized uploads and participation 
in the general scheme, he was found 
contributorily liable. 
The third case involving sysop liability 
for copyright infringement is Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom, an 
opinion issued by a federal court in 
Northern California. The Netcom case 
involved potential liability for an 
infringing USENET posting made by a 
user. The user, Dennis Erlich, was a sub-
scriber of a North Hollywood BBS called 
Support. com operated by defendant Tom 
Klemesrud, who used Netcom as the 
BBS's Internet service provider. 
Erlich posted a message containing the 
copyrighted material of the Religious 
Technology Center, which is an entity 
associated with the Church of 
Scientology. The message was sent by 
Klemesrud's BBS to Netcom's servers, 
which forwarded the message on to 
other USENET servers and made the 
posting available to Netcom's sub-
scribers. Plaintiffs contacted the defen-
dants and asked them to take various 
steps, including the removal of the post-
ing from the USE NET servers. Most of 
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the plaintiff's requests were denied, and 
Erlich's posting remained on Netcom's 
USENET server until it was deleted in 
the ordinary course of purging old 
USENET po stings 11 days later. 
The Religious Technology Center sued 
Erlich, Klemesrud and N etcom under a 
number of theories, including copy-
right infringement. In an opinion 
issued in late 1995, the court dealt 
with Netcom's and Klemesrud's liabili-
ty for copyright infringement. 
The court found that Netcom and 
Klemesrud were not liable for direct 
infringement of the Scientology texts by 
forwarding the work to other USENET 
servers and by displaying the work to 
USENET readers on their services. 
Although their servers made copies of 
the materials, neither Netcom nor 
Klemesrud had done nothing volitional-
ly: "Only the subscriber should be liable 
for causing the distribution of plaintiff's 
work, as the contributing actions of the 
BBS provider are automatic and indis-
criminate." Further, if the court did find 
Netcom or Klemesrud liable as a direct 
infringer, then USENET would neces-
sarily be shut down because each server 
would be directly infringing-a result 
the court did not think was necessary: 
"The court does not find workable a the-
ory of infringement that would find the 
entire Internet liable for activities that 
cannot reasonably be deterred." 
In refusing to hold Netcom and 
Klemesrud directly liable for copyright 
infringement, the Netcom court declined 
to follow the results reached in Frena 
and Sega I holding the sysops directly 
liable for their users' actions. 
With respect to contributory infringe-
ment, the court noted that Netcom and 
Klemesrud were given notice of the exis-
tence of infringing material before the 
posting was automatically flushed. As a 
matter of law, the court concluded that 
"[w]here a [sysop] cannot reasonably 
verify a claim of infringement, either 
because of a possible fair use defense, 
the lack of copyright notices on the copy, 
or the copyright holder's failure to pro-
vide the necessary documentation to 
show that there is a likely infringement, 
the operator's lack of knowledge will be 
found reasonable and there will be no 
liability for contributory infringement 
for allowing the continued distribution 
of the works on its system." By implica-
tion, therefore, if the sysop receives a 
valid and adequate notice of copyright 
infringement occurring on its servers 
and fails to act, the sysop could be con-
tributorily liable. The court reserved the 
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issue of whether or not Netcom and 
Klemesrud had sufficient notice for fur-
ther argument by the parties. 
The court also addressed whether 
Netcom should be "vicariously" liable for 
Erlich's behavior. In copyright law, vic-
arious liability accrues when a party 
has sufficient "right and ability to con-
trol" behavior and receives a direct 
financial benefit from the behavior. 
Although the court could not make a 
factual determination about N etcom's 
right and ability to control Erlich, the 
court found that Netcom did not direct-
ly benefit financially from Erlich and 
therefore was not liable. (Klemesrud's 
vicarious liability was not thoroughly 
addressed because of a procedural error 
made by the plaintiffs.) 
Finally, the Netcom court addressed 
whether Netcom's behavior was excus-
able under the "fair use" defense. "Fair 
use" is a defense to claims of infringe-
ment and can be found by analyzing 
four factors: the purpose and character 
of the use, the nature of copyrighted 
work, the amount and substantiality of 
the portion taken, and the effect of the 
use on the potential market for the work 
(all four factors are considered, although 
the last is considered the most impor-
tant). Although N etcom did copy the 
entire work in some cases, the court 
noted that Netcom only copied the 
amount of the work necessary to act as 
a USENET node. The court reserved as 
a factual matter whether or not 
Netcom's use was fair. 
The Netcom case was a well-reasoned 
case and it tells us a lot about the lat-
est thinking on sysop liability for copy-
right infringement. Although the case 
was not a clear victory for N etcom or 
Klemesrud, it is fairly clear that they 
were unlikely to face liability for act-
ing as a USENET node. However, 
Netcom and Klemesrud were poten-
tially subject to liability because they 
were informed that their system con-
tained infringing material and they 
failed to act. Even in this case, the 
court seemed sympathetic to Netcom's 
argument that it should not be forced 
to remove infringing material just 
because it receives an unsupported 
assertion that the material infringes. 
Therefore, unlike the Frena and Sega I 
cases, which effectively held sysops 
strictly liable for any copyright 
infringement on their systems, the 
Netcom court established some mean-
ingful thresholds on possible sysop lia-
bility. For better or worse, we will 
never know how the Netcom court 
would finally resolve the issues. In the 
Fall of 1996 Klemesrud settled for 
$50,000 and Netcom settled under a 
cloak of confidentiality. 
Finally, an international copyright case is 
worth mentioning. In the case 
Scientology v. Providers, a decision ren-
dered by the District Court of the Hague 
in March 1996, the Church of Scientology 
sued 22 Internet service providers (ISPs) 
and one Internet user (who had a home 
page containing Church of Scientology 
material) for copyright infringement and 
trade secret misappropriation, seeking 
an injunction against further infringe-
ment. The claim against the user failed 
because the user had already modified 
her page to delete some materials and 
had retained only those materials that 
had been published before (and therefore 
were not trade secrets), and the remain-
der were subject to the Danish equiva-
lent of fair use. As for the ISPs, the court 
concluded that the ISPs had no knowl-
edge of what their users do and no abili-
ty to influence such actions. Therefore, 
"there is no reason to hold them respon-
sible for wrongful acts of users, e.g., copy-
right infringements by third parties." 
However, the court might have reached a 
different result if the ISP knew of the 
users' actions and further knew they 
were unequivocally wrongful. 
DEFAMATION 
There have been two reported cases in 
the United States that have addressed 
sysop liability for defamation. 
The first case is Cubby v. Compu-
Serve, a 1991 decision from the Federal 
district court in New York City. In this 
case, CompuServe, an international 
online service, contracted with Cameron 
Communications for Cameron to man-
age CompuServe's Journalism Forum. 
Cameron in turn contracted with Don 
Fitzpatrick Associates for Fitzpatrick to 
supply its periodical Rumorville USA to 
the Journalism Forum. In addition to 
being CompuServe subscribers, Rumor-
ville readers had to contract with 
Fitzpatrick for the right to read the peri-
odical. CompuServe's only compensation 
related to Rumorville was for the time 
its users spent online reading 
Rumorville. It received no share of the 
subscriptions paid to Fitzpatrick nor 
made a separate subscription or access 
fee charge to readers. 
In 1990, Rumorville USA published some 
statements that the plaintiffs alleged 
were defamatory, and the plaintiffs sued 
CompuServe and Fitzpatrick for libel, 
business disparagement and unfair com-
petition. In the case, CompuServe asked 
for the court to dismiss CompuServe from 
further proceedings. 
At issue is whether CompuServe was a 
"publisher" of Rumorville or a "distribu-
tor" of Rumorville. The law accords spe-
cial protection to distributors, because to 
impose excessive liability on them would 
force them to review all content they dis-
tribute, which is an impermissibly heavy 
burden under the First Amendment. The 
court concluded that "CompuServe ... is 
in essence an electronic, for-profit library 
. .. " and noted that once CompuServe (or, 
in this case, its independent contractor) 
decides to carry a publication, it will 
exercise little editorial control over the 
contents of that publication. 
Therefore, CompuServe could be liable 
for the contents of Rumorville only if it 
knew or had reason to know of the 
allegedly defamatory statements. Since 
CompuServe did not review the con-
tents of Rumorville before it was pub-
lished, and did not otherwise have any 
reason to know of defamatory state-
ments in Rumorville, CompuServe was 
not liable for Rumorville's statements. 
The court also rejected vicarious liabili-
ty on CompuServe's part for the actions 
of Cameron and Fitzpatrick, noting that 
CompuServe had delegated manage-
ment of the Journalism Forum to 
Cameron. The court rejected arguments 
that CompuServe's requirement that 
Cameron manage the forum in accor-
dance with CompuServe's standards, 
CompuServe's training of Cameron and 
the indemnity from CompuServe to 
Cameron were sufficient to give 
CompuServe control over Cameron. 
For many years lawyers and industry 
members believed that the Cubby case 
was the definitive statement regard-
ing sysop liability for the statements 
or actions of its users. Indeed, until 
the Frena case, Cubby was the only 
reported case on the subject. Further-
more, the standard articulated in 
Cubby-that CompuServe was liable 
only if it knew or had reason to know 
of the allegedly defamatory state-
ment-provided a reasonably well-
defined, relatively high threshold for 
insulating sysops from liability. 
Thus, the industry received a rude 
shock from Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy, a decision handed down by the 
New York Supreme Court (the lowest 
court in New York) in May 1995. The 
case involved postings to Prodigy's 
Money Talk forum that allegedly 
defamed Stratton Oakmont and its 
High qualify 
Easyaaess 
president. These postings were made 
from an inactive account held by a for-
mer employee, and therefore the poster 
was effectively anonymous. Again, the 
issue was whether Prodigy was a "pub-
lisher" of the statements and therefore 
subject to a higher standards of poten-
tialliability for defamation. 
Throughout the early 1990s, Prodigy 
had aggressively marketed itself as 
the family-oriented online service. In 
particular, Prodigy had claimed to 
exercise editorial control over its con-
tent and had repeatedly analogized 
itself to a newspaper. To accomplish 
its objectives, at one time Prodigy 
had deployed dozens of employees to 
prescreen and review every public 
posting. Prodigy also used a number 
of techniques to control the content 
made publicly available on its ser-
vice: using software that pre-
screened for a proscribed list of 
words; promulgating user guide-
lines which prohibited messages 
that were insulting, repugnant to 
the community, or harmful to a har-
monious community; using "Board 
Leaders" to enforce these guide-
lines; and making available techni-
cal tools for Board Leaders to delete 
offensive messages. 
contact: racksales@texas.net 
or far mare information: www.texas.net/servlces/power.html 
Texas Networking, Inc. 
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The court concluded that Prodigy was a 
publisher as a matter of law, and there-
fore subject to liability for defamation as 
a publisher, for two primary reasons. 
First, Prodigy had held itself out as 
exercising editorial control. Second, the 
use of prescreening software and Board 
Leaders to enforce subjective guidelines 
meant that Prodigy was making deci-
sions about content. 
Furthermore, the court held that the 
Money Talk forum's Board Leader was an 
agent of Prodigy, and therefore Prodigy 
was vicariously liable for the Board 
Leader's actions. Despite rather clear lan-
guage in Prodigy's agreement with the 
Board Leaders disclaiming an agency 
relationship, the court found that by 
requiring the Board Leaders to enforce 
Prodigy's guidelines and by requiring 
Board Leaders to seek guidance from 
Prodigy, Prodigy had "managed" the 
Board Leaders such that they were con-
sidered agents as a matter of law. 
The Stratton Oakmont case was widely 
criticized when it was issued, in part 
because of the sweeping implications of 
the court's ruling and in part because of 
its inability to be easily reconciled with 
the Cubby case. Indeed, by 1994 (the 
time of the po stings at issue in Stratton 
Oakmont), Prodigy was no longer 
attempting to control the content on its 
system in a meaningfully different way 
than was AOL or CompuServe. 
However, there is no doubt that the 
Stratton Oak-mont result can be 
explained in part by Prodigy's very public 
assertions in the early 1990s about its 
exercise of editorial control-assertions 
Production 
FORISPs 
visit our website! 
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that came back to haunt Prodigy 
(although the case ultimately settled 
without Prodigy having to pay any money 
to Stratton Oakmont). 
As discussed below, the Stratton 
Oakmont case may no longer be good law. 
However, a few lessons can still be 
learned from it. First, any marketing 
campaign must be carefully considered 
in the context ofthe legal environment in 
which the company operates. Prodigy 
may very well have been able to persuade 
the judge to follow the Cubby reasoning if 
Prodigy did not have all of its declara-
tions from years past to explain away. 
Second, although manipulation of user 
content is necessarily required in the 
process of making it publicly available, 
the more manipulation the 
more than a 
logically-chall 
judge might "Ull"'l~":; 
it to be a form of 
torial control. 
fore, despite the 
advantages to 
matic word fil 
port a claim of 
ial control and 
fore should be 
advisedly. Third, 
agreements regard-
ing the posting of con-
tent should be drafted 
extremely carefully, so that "subjective" 
standards are minimized. Typically, a 
clause requiring users not to make any 
illegal po stings is sufficient to restrict 
most noxious conduct-without creating 
the opportunity for the sysop to be per-
ceived as applying "subjective" standards 
that look like editorial control. 
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 
Although there have been many cases 
involving sysop liability for obscene or 
pornographic material, none of these 
cases have involved sysop liability for 
user po stings. 
However, the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA), a portion of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, deals squarely 
with sysop liability for "indecent" post-
ings by their users. Gen-erally, the CDA 
prohibits users from knowingly sending 
content that is "obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy or indecent, with intent to 
annoy, abuse, threaten or harass" anoth-
er person or sending content that is 
obscene or indecent knowing that the 
recipient is under 18. The CDA also pro-
hibits knowingly sending or displaying 
content to persons under 18 any content 
that, in context, depicts or describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, 
sexual or excretory activities or organs. 
In both cases, individuals who knowing-
ly permit any "telecommunications facil-
ity" under their control to be used for 
such activities, with the intent that the 
facilities be used for such activities, are 
also liable. 
There are many defenses described in the 
CDA, and mapping out the contours of 
these defenses is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, in many cases such 
analysis is currently moot-almost all of 
the operative provisions of the CDA have 
been enjoined in the much-heralded case 
ACLU v. Reno. The ACLU case is current-
ly pending before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and a ruling 




in the CDA is partic-
ularly important: 
"No provider or user 
of an interactive 
computer service 
shall be treated as 
the publisher or 
speaker of any infor-
mation provided by 
another information 
content provider." 
The legislative history on this provision 
says "[o]ne of the specific purposes of this 
section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers as pub-
lishers or speakers of content that is not 
their own because they have restricted 
access to objectionable material." 
This section raises as many questions as 
it answers. On its face, it appears to 
negate many forms of sysop liability for 
third party actions or statements, 
resolving many of the ambiguities dis-
cussed in this paper. On the other hand, 
there are several questions: 
Will courts give effect to this provision if 
the remainder of the operative provi-
sions of the CDA are permanently 
struck down as unconstitutional? 
Will courts give effect to this provision if 
the sysop is not trying to restrict access 
to objectionable materials but is merely 
exercising a more general form of edito-
rial control? 
Will this language be extended to cover 
sysop liability for copyright infringe-
ment, which does not use the term "pub-
lisher" or "speaker" but instead uses the 
terms "reproduce," "distribute," and 
"publicly display"? 
TRADEMARKS 
The Frena and Sega cases both 
addressed sysop liability for trademark 
infringement. However, in both cases the 
sysop was the party taking the actions 
resulting in trademark in-fringement. In 
Fre-na's case, Frena had inserted his own 
proprietary rights no-tices into the GIFs; 
in the Sega case, the sysop had developed 
ftle descriptions and hierarchies which 
used Sega's trademarks. Therefore, these 
cases contribute little to our understand-
ing of sysop liability for third party trade-
mark infringement. 
However, a decision somewhat relevant to 
this topic was reached in Panavision v. 
Toeppen in a decision reached in No-
vember 1996 in a federal district court in 
Los Angeles. In the case, the domain 
name registry Network Solutions, Inc. 
(NSI) was sued for negligent interference 
with prospective economic advantage for 
giving the domain names panavision.com 
and panaflex.com (both of which are reg-
istered trademarks owned by Pana-
vision) to Dennis Toeppen, a notorious 
domain name hijacker. The tort of for neg-
ligent interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage is a relatively nebulous 
one and therefore courts are reluctant to 
extend liability too far-defendants must 
have a "special relationship" with plain-
tiffs in order to be liable. The Panavision 
court ruled that such a special relation-
ship did not exist between NSI and 
Panavision. NSI did not know that 
Toeppen's actions were intended to inter-
fere with Panavision's rights, and ''NSI is 
under no general duty to investigate 
whether a given registration is improp-
er." Although this language is context-
specific to the general duties of reg-
istries for negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage, the 
reasoning of the case might apply to 
insulate sysops for trademark infringe-
ments committed by their users. 
SO WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
There are no clear trends about whether 
or not we really want sysops to act as 
the guarantor for the harms caused by 
their users. The Frena, Sega I and 
Stratton Oakmont cases very liberally 
imposed liability on sysops. Other cases, 
such as Netcom and Cubby, have im-
posed significant hurdles on finding 
sysops liable. The legislative trends 
have been no more clear. The rumblings 
made in congress and at the WIPO con-
ference toward increased sysop liability 
are ominous. But the CDA, roundly crit-
icized as a horrendous law, seems to 
absolve sysops for many types of liability. 
In the midst of the confusion, however, 
one phrase comes up repeatedly: Did the 
sysop "know or have reason to know" of 
the harmful conduct? This standard 
requires that the sysop had actual 
knowledge or deliberately ignored the 
problem before imposing liability on the 
sysop. On the other hand, it does give 
harmed third parties, like copyright 
owners or defamed parties, the opportu-
nity to limit their harm by forcing action 
when the sysop is informed of a prob-
lem. This solution avoids a legal regime 
of liability so chilling as to drive sysops 
out of the business, without permitting 
anarchy to reign on the Internet. 
Nevertheless, there is no promise that 
the rules to be developed regarding 
sysop liability will strike any balance at 
all. As more cases are decided by judges 
who do not understand the technology, 
and as more sweeping and broad legis-
lation is introduced by legislators who 
do not understand the technology, the 
only predictable results are chaos, con-
fusion and long battles to preserve the 
emerging cyberspace industry. + 
The technology is now ava.1able for rou to become a 
high-volume provider of low-cost, fully automatic remote 
data backup services. 
Be an early entrant into a massive new technology 
services market! 
Target the huge business and persanal desktop/partable PC 
user market! 
~ Bundle your new remote backup service affering with 
additianal services! 
~ Rapid investment rayback periadslbreak-even points on 
system lease casts. 
~ Law assaciated aperatianal, maintenance, and 
overhead casts! 
For a complete information package, call 
1-800-537-6306 
~ Piggyback aff af current anline service infrastructures via 
strategic alliances! 
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